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This was an appeal by a group of activists who had been convicted of the offence of 
‘intentional disruption of services at an aerodrome’ contrary to s. 1(2)(b) of the Aviation 
and Maritime Security Act 1990 (‘the 1990 Act’). The 15 appellants had breached a 
security perimeter fence at Stansted Airport in order to prevent a flight from taking off 
that had been chartered by the Home Office to deport 60 individuals to West Africa. 
They had erected makeshift tripods built from scaffolding poles and, with the help of 
builders’ foam, “locked on” to one another around the base of one of the tripods and 
around the nose wheel of the plane. In response to the appellants’ conduct, the single 
runway was closed for a significant period. 23 planes had to be diverted to other 
airports, and a number of take-offs were delayed. 
 
The appellants had initially been arrested for several summary offences but were 
subsequently indicted and convicted under s. 1(2)(b) of the 1990 Act which makes it 
an offence ‘for any person by means of any device, substance or weapon unlawfully 
and intentionally to disrupt the services of such an aerodrome, in such a way as to 
endanger or be likely to endanger the safe operation of the aerodrome or the safety of 
persons at the aerodrome.’ 
 
They advanced five grounds of appeal: firstly, that the trial judge had misinterpreted s. 
1(2)(b) of the 1990 Act in the light of its international and domestic law context and 
erred in his analysis of the offence elements. The offence concerned serious violence 
of a terrorist nature, not the much lower level of risks generated by the appellants’ 
actions. Secondly, that the judge should have ordered disclosure (of background 
material relating to the Attorney General’s consent to the prosecution as well as Home 
Office material concerning the immigration status of those threatened with removal) 
and stayed the prosecution on the basis that the Attorney General’s consent had been 
wrongly given. Thirdly, that the judge should not have withdrawn from the jury the 
defences of preventing crime under s. 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 and 
necessity/duress of circumstances. Fourthly, that the judge’s summing up lacked 
balance in that he had commented on aspects of risk of harm arising from the appellants’ 
action that went beyond the arguments advanced or evidence relied upon by the Crown. 
And fifthly, that the judge ought to have directed the jury not to draw adverse inferences 
from the appellants’ no comment interviews. 
 
Held, allowing the appeal on the first ground and quashing all of the appellants’ 
convictions, that the appellants should not have been prosecuted for the extremely 
serious offence under s. 1(2)(b) of the 1990 Act because their conduct did not satisfy 
the offence elements. There was, in truth, no case to answer. The Court acknowledged 
that the various summary offences with which the appellants were originally charged, 
if proved, might well not have reflected the gravity of their actions. That, however, did 
not allow the use of an offence which aimed at conduct of a different nature (at [113]). 
 
By enacting s. 1 of the 1990 Act Parliament had given domestic effect to the Montreal 
Convention [for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation] 
as supplemented by the Montreal Protocol [for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation] (at [55]). The Montreal Protocol 
had introduced a further layer of protection against activities which were essentially of 
a violent nature and “of a certain level of magnitude”. Section 1 of the 1990 Act, in 
consonance with the policies and objects of the Protocol, had created an offence of 
universal jurisdiction attracting a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The offence 
was so serious that the court was enjoined to consider the dangerousness provisions of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and it was also a “Convention offence” for the purposes 
of the Terrorism Act 2006. The appellants’ actions were not readily captured by the 
language and purposes of the Protocol (at [62]). 
 
The “device [or] substance” had to be intrinsically dangerous to be caught by the 
statutory wording [of s. 1(2)(b)]. There was no evidence before the jury to suggest that 
the builders’ foam and poles were capable of causing the sort of damage contemplated 
by s.1(1) and s.1(2)(a) (at [69]). 
 
The term “unlawfully” was statutorily defined in s. 1(9) and could not be ignored (at 
[72]). “By means of” was synonymous with “using”. It required proof of a causal link 
between the use of the device (i.e. the builders’ materials) and the disruption. The 
runway was closed as soon as air traffic control was warned about the presence of 
individuals in the vicinity of the aircraft. That happened before the devices were used 
in any way (at [73]).  
 
“To disrupt the services of the aerodrome” referred to the whole airport and required 
proof of more than limited interference with traffic movements on the ramp or directing 
a number of police officers to the scene. Whether this part of the statutory test was met 
would be a matter of fact and degree (at [74]). 
 
“Services of the aerodrome” should not be limited to the take-off and landing of planes 
because numerous ancillary activities had to be performed to enable those things to 
happen. In any case, the disruption in the instant case included the closure of the runway 
and the taking of understandable safety measures and precautions in response to the 
appellants’ presence in a restricted area in proximity to an aircraft that was being 
prepared for flight. It was not immediately apparent that they were engaged in a protest. 
To that extent, there was a clear causal link between the appellants’ presence at the 
scene and the services at the aerodrome being disrupted (at [74-75]). 
 
The purpose of the subordinate clause "in such a way as to endanger or be likely to 
endanger the safe operation of the aerodrome or the safety of the persons at the 
aerodrome” was to qualify or delimit the type of disruption that had to occur for the 
offence to be made out. “In such a way” did no more than make it clear that proof of 
disruption in itself was insufficient; it had to be disruption to the services of the 
aerodrome which gave rise to endangerment or likely endangerment to safety (at [77]). 
 
The offence required proof of likely endangerment to safety and that introduced two 
further qualifications. First, that the chances of the danger arising had to reach a certain 
degree of likelihood, and secondly that it had to be of a sufficient nature and degree to 
amount to endangerment, i.e. to something that may properly be described as a peril. 
The test was a composite one, and the available evidence fell well short of meeting it 
(at [80]).  
 
The final issue that arose under the first ground was whether the 
appellants intended disruption to the services of the aerodrome that would likely 
endanger its safety or the safety of persons (at [85]). It was a strong inference that it 
was not the aim or purpose of the appellants to cause any wider disruption (at [86]). If, 
as held, it was necessary for the Crown to go further than prove disruption to this 
particular flight, the judge had not left to the jury the issue of whether each of the 
appellants intended (1) to disrupt the services of the aerodrome, and (2) by such 
disruption, some likely endangerment to the safe operation of Stansted airport and the 
safety of persons there. The jury should have been directed that they had to be satisfied 
so that they were sure that this consequence was a virtual certainty, or at the least very 





The trial of the activists (also known as the ‘Stansted 15’) for an offence that is 
primarily aimed at large-scale acts of violence had attracted a lot of criticism. There 
can be no doubt that quashing the appellants’ convictions for such a crass crime is the 
right outcome: the 1990 Act was passed in the wake of the Lockerbie bombing and 
sought to implement into English law a convention (the ‘Montreal Protocol’) that 
criminalises, at an international level, actions commonly associated with terrorism. This 
context alone warrants and supports the narrow interpretation imposed by the Court of 
Appeal on the s.1(2)(b) offence. The instant decision is significant in that it clarifies the 
various offence elements whilst expounding the inaptness of charging this particular 
offence in relation to non-violent direct action on airport grounds. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the judgment is very dismissive of the appellants’ attempts to invoke 
the defences of necessity, prevention of crime and duress of circumstances. It notes that 
the UK has a ‘system of immigration control created by an accountable democratic 
process and subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review’ where ‘immigration 
decisions may be challenged in the tribunals and the courts’ (at [101]). In the court’s 
view, ‘the real reason for halting this flight was that [the appellants] believe that all 
removals and deportations are “illegal” in the sense in which they would choose to use 
the term. Essentially, therefore, this was the appellants seeking to take the law into their 
own hands’ (at [101]). This is a legitimate concern; however, it is interesting to note 
that, of the 60 passengers on board the hindered flight, reportedly at least five have 
since managed to establish a legal right to remain in the UK, lending some force to the 
appellants’ contention that some of the deportations may have been improper or at least 
premature. 
 
The court’s discussion of the intention issue is, however, noteworthy. The court 
suggests that ‘there remains some debate as to whether foresight of “virtual certainty” 
as opposed to “a very high degree of probability” is required (see Blackstone’s Criminal 
Practice, 2021 edition, paras B1.13-B1.14). “Virtual certainty” derives from the 
judgment of Lord Lane CJ in Nedrick and probably still represents the law’ (at [86]). 
 
Those who teach, rather than practice, criminal law may be forgiven for having 
assumed that the House of Lords had settled this issue in Woollin. In truth, though, 
Thacker is not the only case recently to have cast doubt on the continued relevance of 
the virtual certainty model jury direction, although it may be the first case of note to do 
so explicitly (if cautiously: ‘probably’ leaves wriggle room for later courts to backtrack 
from the sufficiency of ‘a very high degree of probability’ to establish intention). 
 
The court bases its proposition that oblique intent may be inferred from foresight of a 
very high probability on a passage from Blackstone’s Criminal Practice (which, in turn, 
relies on the attempted murder case of Walker (1990) 90 Cr App R 226 (CA), decided 
post-Nedrick but before Woollin). As a matter of authority, however, it would be better 
to base the proposition on the Supreme Court decision in Jogee which, as the court 
acknowledges (by citing Jogee alongside Moloney, Nedrick, Woollin and MD), is the 
latest authority to have considered the relationship between intention and foresight. 
 
While Jogee is clear that foresight can be evidence of intention, a threshold condition 
to curtail the jury’s ability to infer that an accessory intended to assist murder from 
evidence that he anticipated his conduct would assist the principal’s commission of that 
crime is conspicuously absent from the Supreme Court’s judgment. This can be 
contrasted with Woollin where the House of Lords was adamant that the jury is ‘not 
entitled’ to conclude that a killer acted with oblique intent unless the evidence makes 
them sure that he had appreciated that death or grievous bodily harm was a virtually 
certain consequence of his actions. 
 
In (potentially) parting ways with Woollin on whether there is a prescribed minimum 
level of foresight below which juries must not infer (or find) oblique intent, Jogee has 
introduced an inconsistency into the law of intention as it applies to perpetrators and 
accessories respectively. This, although flagged by academic commentators (see David 
Ormerod QC & Karl Laird, ‘Jogee: not the end of a legal saga but the start of one?’ 
[2016] 8 Crim LR 539-552; Beatrice Krebs, ‘Oblique intent, foresight and 
authorisation’ (2018) 7(2) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1-24), remains 
unresolved. Perhaps Thacker then is the first judicial attempt to address this issue (by 
doubting the Woollin virtual certainty direction) which is not just academic: if there is 
a threshold condition for perpetrators but not accessories, it may still be easier to prove 
intention against secondary parties than principal offenders, and juries may need to be 
given different directions, depending on the defendant’s role, which could be confusing 
where a defendant has been charged as perpetrator and accessory in the alternative. 
 
The virtual certainty approach has many critics (and the House of Lords left open the 
possibility that the judiciary would revisit it). But if it goes, what should replace it? The 
problem with a less restrictive foresight criterion to delineate legal intention is that the 
criminal law might end up on the same slippery slope that led to the infamous line of 
murder appeals starting with Hyam and ending with Woollin (though Jogee may be the 
latest addition yet) and, in the context of complicity, to the adoption of parasitic 
accessory liability and foresight as a mens rea element in its own right. I have explained 
elsewhere (Beatrice Krebs, ‘Oblique intent, foresight and authorisation’ (2018) 7(2) 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 1, 16-22) how an endorsement-based 
conception of intention (asking ‘did the defendant endorse the consequences of his 
actions?’ and, in the context of complicity, ‘did the defendant endorse the principal’s 
actions or their consequences?’) could rationalise Jogee and replace Woollin, whilst 
anchoring direct and oblique intent under a common denominator, and why this remains 
within interpretative reach of the common law. 
 
The Court of Appeal unfortunately went no further than to say that the jury should have 
been given a proper direction on the meaning of (oblique) intention, in terms of either 
‘virtual certainty’ or ‘very high’ probability. It remains to be seen what a future (or 
differently constituted) Court of Appeal makes of the relevant dicta in Thacker, if 
anything. But it may well be that the (judicial) intention debate has just been reopened 
– which might not be a bad thing in light of (1) the unpopularity of the Woollin 
direction, (2) its extremely rare use in practice, and (3) the many interpretational and 
conceptual difficulties with the notion of an inferred (conditional) intent to assist or 
encourage crime as exposed in Jogee. 
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